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Abstract  
Nowadays, concerns about the consequences of events caused by hazardous substances have 
become a global issue, therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze gas leak events in gas 
refinery by the combination of Tripod Beta and RCA methods. The case study is (phases of 9 and 
10) the fifth refinery of South Pars Gas Complex. In order to gather information, library and field
methods were used. The information was gathered by visiting the site and interviewing with 
operators and safety personnel. The questionnaire was used in this study. The statistical population 
included 15HSE and professional health care experts working at safety and operation units in the 
refinery. The gathered information was analyzed by a combination of Tripod Beta and RCA 
methods and library studies were used to make a conceptual research model and a theoretical 
framework. Based on the obtained results, the average age of participants in this study was 4.35 
years. The results show that the dangers to human health with the average of 78.3 are the most 
important danger compared to equipment and environmental dangers. The most important threat to 
the equipment is the detectors’ breakdown and massive explosion, and the most important 
environmental danger is the increase of hydro-sulfur in the atmosphere. The death and injury to vital 
and sensitive parts of body have the highest frequency among other dangers. In fact, experts 
believed that death or serious injury to personnel should take the first priority. Corrective actions 
can include current processes and procedures, use of equipment, rules and regulations and the 
training of human resources. 
Keywords: gas leak, gas refinery, Tripod Beta, RCA 
Introduction 
In order to meet the requirement of life, the society has to use industrial material and 
productions and go towards the use of new technologies, materials and energy. The progressive 
development of science and technology along with the discovery and the use of different types of 
chemical compounds will provide many human needs, but they will also have side effects and 
disastrous consequences which will eventually lead to the destruction of economic, human and 
environmental sources in the form of events such as explosion, fire, gas leak and dispersion of 
poisonous materials (Adl et al, 2007). The huge gas and oil sources and significant cost savings 
regarding this issue ensure the necessity of priority and investment in this industry so that the South 
Pars gas field in Assaluyeh region of Iran having more than 14 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves 
has the priority in development projects(Arzandeh, 2009). On the other hand, the numbers of 
refineries and their products have increased and as a result, the numbers of people working in these 
industries and populations living in the surrounding have also increased (Habibiet al., 2011). 
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Nowadays, the concerns about the consequences of events caused by hazardous substances 
have become a global issue (Hosseini Jenabet al., 2012). Today, human life has found the close and 
inevitable relationship with different chemical industry. One of the most important industries is oil, 
gas and petrochemicals industry. Due to the priority and investment in this area, these kinds of 
studies are very important in our country (Abbaspouret al., 2009). On the other hand, the increase in 
the industrial complexes in this field leads to the growth of population of people working in this 
industry or living in the surroundingwhichcauses that the relevant health and safety become more 
important (Habibi, et al., 2011). According to the statistics, the average of 6000 people die of work-
related accidents or diseases every day, i.e. more than 2.2 million people die due to their work-
related activities which is meant to state that3000 people die while they are working. It is estimated 
that the costs which are due to the loss of manpower, equipment and time exceed $ 5000000 each 
year (Somavia, 2005).One of the incidents that can alwaysincur in the industrial processing unit is 
the release or the leak of poisonous material in the environment which can incur due to failure of a 
deviceor personnel’ mistake. The gas and oil leak is one of the most important events in the phases 
of construction, pre-commissioning, commissioning and the production of oil, gas and 
petrochemical (Abbaspour et al., 2009). Natural gas leak is more important than other chemical 
leaks such as ammonia and chlorine. Gas leak can cause not only respiratory dangers but also 
explosion and fire in the whole complex. Dealing with gas leak incidents requires the application of 
new knowledge and technologies among which modeling is one of them. Modeling includes the 
prediction of the effect of chemical release and broadcast in the environment by mathematical 
modeling. It evaluates the effects of the incident as damage to property, infrastructure, human health 
and the environment and usually uses a four-stage model scenarios, situation analysis, incident 
modeling and damage assessment (Hosseini Jenab, 2012;Chavoshi et al., 2011). The main outcome 
of flammable and toxic chemical release is fire, explosion and the release of toxic substances 
(Rezaiet al., 2012). The purpose of this study is to evaluate gas leak events in gas refinery With the 
Combination of Tripod Beta and RCA; a case study of (phases 9 and 10) of South Pars Gas 
Complex in fifth refinery. 
 
The Scope of the Study 
The scope of the study is the South Pars gas field which is one of world's largest independent 
gas resources which is on the borderline of Iran and Qatar and it is considered as on the most 
important energy resources of the country (Ghasemi,2013). The total area of this field is 9700 square 
kilometers and Iran has 3700 square kilometers of this field. The gas reserve is about 9% of the total 
global gas reserve and it is 48% of the gas reserves in Iran (Public Relations Department of National 
Petrochemical Company, 2010). Today, 25 thousand people are working directly in the field of 
South Pars and this figure will exceed 60 thousand people in the near future (Ghanbariet al., 1999). 
 
Methodology 
To gather information, library and field methods were used. The internet and library were 
used to write the literature review. The information was gathered by visiting the site and 
interviewing with operators and safety personnel. The questionnaire was used in this study. The 
statistical population of this study involved 15 HSE and professional health care experts working at 
safety and operation units in the refinery. After being edited by some experts, the questionnaire was 
given to the participants; the received results were analyzed, and then the final questionnaire was 
designed in the larger scale. Cronbach's alpha was used to measure the reliability of the 
questionnaire and the alpha coefficient was calculated using the following equation: 
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Equation (1):Rୟ = ୨୨ିଵ (1 −
Sౠమ
Sమ ) 
Where J is the numbers of sub-questions in the questionnaire, Sj2 is the variance of each 
section of the questionnaire, and S2 is the variance of the total questionnaire.  
Using the reliability test in the statistical software, Cronbach's alpha was used to analyze the 
questionnaire. The descriptive statistics were presented using central tendency and dispersion and it 
was used with factor analysis results as an inferential statistics andall statistical operations were 
conducted by SPSS software (version 20). 
After studying the documents and the existing conditions in phases 9 and 10 of South Pars 
Gas Complex in fifth refinery, the information received from the reports and observations, the 
incidents of fifth refinery were analyzed by the combination of Tripod Beta and RCA methods; the 
library studies were used to make a conceptual research model and a theoretical framework. 
To investigate the core, direct and intermediary causes, the incidents were evaluated by RCA 
and Tripod Beta techniques, and then the two results were compared to each other and finally, 
according to the received information, some practical solutions were presented to prevent and 
reduce the incidents. Tripod Beta is based on three pillars of danger, goal and incident and the 
analysis of the incidents are based on the following factors:  
1. To illustrate a chart and the determination of danger, goal and incident 
2. To determine the protective systems (control and defense) 
3. To identify surface problems (unsafe acts and conditions) 
4. To use the attached checklist in order to determine the preconditions and hidden 
problems (Mohammadi et al., 2013) 
5. To determine an effective pre-conditions and invisible problems in incidents based on 
the above mentioned checklist and entering them in the table to manage the invisible problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Process of the Stages 
 
“What”, “How” and “Why” an incident happened is determined by RCA method and the 
purpose of the RCA is to achieve a systematic method in order to determine the main reason of 
incident and to ensure that the same incident will not incur anymore and it can be mentioned that a 
combined Tripod Beta and RCA methods can realize the ability of the immune system and the 
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management of gas refinery under study. The stages of this study were schematically shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
The Prioritization of Criteria and the Validity and Reliability of the Questionnaire and 
the Individual Characteristics of Experts 
In this section, the questionnaire was used to survey the members of the panel of experts. By 
surveying the statistical population, the prioritization of gas refinery dangers were taken into 
account and at the end, the prioritization of gas leak incident and weighting events were 
manipulated.The reliability of the questionnaire was determined by Cronbach's alpha. Regarding the 
fact that Cronbach's alpha coefficient is higher than 7.0 for each variable, it shows that the 
questionnaire has a good validity. The statistical population of this study involved 15 HSE and 
professional health care experts working at safety and operation units in the refinery. The individual 
characteristics results of the panel of experts such as age, gender, marital status and educational 
degree is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The frequency distribution of the individual characteristics of the panel members 
Variable Ranges Frequency percentage 
Age 20-30 2 13.33 
31-40 11 73.33 
41-50 2 13.34 
Sex  Male 15 100 
Female  0 0 
Marital Statues  Single  3 20 
Married 12 80 
 
Education 
Diploma  0 0 
Associate degree 3 20 
BA/BS 10 66.66 
MA/BA and above 2 13.33 
 
The panel members have been graduated from different fields of study such as engineering 
(4individuals), HSE (4individuals), health professionals (3individuals), environmental health 
(1individual), environmental pollution (1 individual), disaster management (1 individual) and civil 
engineering (1 individual). The average work experience was 9.7 years which was in the range of 1-
16 years.   
 
Table 2. The results of the central indexes and dispersion of factors (dangers) 
NO Factors  Average Standard 
deviation 
The coefficient 
of variation 
1 Danger to the human health 3.78 0.042 1.11 
2 Danger to the instruments 3.40 0.03 0.88 
3 Danger to the environment  3.16 0.03 0.94 
 
Central Indexes and Danger Dispersion 
According to the results in Table 2, human danger with the average of 3.78 is the most 
important gas refinery danger which regarding preservation of human life and health in comparison 
with equipment and environment dangers has more importance. Based on the participants’ priorities, 
  
    Natural science section 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                     855 
 
the environmental dangers with an average of 16.3 are less effective than other options in terms of 
danger. This selection is based on the extent and degree of deterioration, the consequences of the 
accident as well as the likelihood of incident.  
 
The Results of Frequency and Danger Priority  
The dangers which are given too much importance by experts are mentioned here. The 
results of frequency, percentage and prioritization of items regardless of the defined factors have 
been investigated. In Table 3, the frequency and prioritization of dangers in the gas refinery is 
provided. The highest frequency rate belongs to death or injury to vital and sensitive organs. 
Extensive gas leak equipment dangers, fires in the units as well as the damage to the furnace achieve 
the fourth or fifth rate. The final priority is often related to environmental dangers. 
 
Table 3. The results of frequency, percentage and prioritization of items 
No Dangers  Frequency Percentage Priority 
1 Death or damage to vital and sensitive organs  14 93 1 
2 Explosion and damage to the personnel 
working in the naked tower 
13 86 2 
3 Burn caused by fire or explosion 13 86 2 
4 Gas poisoning (inlet gas, sulfur, etc) 11 73 3 
5 Extensive gas leak and fire at units 10 66 4 
6 Damage to the furnace and disorder in the 
naked tower 
9 60 5 
7 Freezing and burning caused by spreading 
propane 
8 53 6 
8 The overflow of soluble materials from 
V51003 container and the destruction of 
Plantair 
8 53 6 
9 Personnel fall from height 8 53 6 
10 The release of hydro-sulfur into the 
atmosphere 
7 46 7 
11 The disorder in the process of Klaus 6 40 8 
12 The sulfuric acid leakage in a closed space 
caused by the increase of the flow  
5 33 9 
13 The increase of release of ethanol amine into 
the environment and the increase of 
groundwater nitrate 
3 20 10 
14 Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the 
combustion of fossil fuels and hydrocarbons 
1 6 10 
15 Sour water production and the release of 
water resources without any control  
1 6 10 
 
The Factor Analysis Dangers and a Summary of the Records of Incidents from Gas 
Leaks at Refineries 
In order to set the data to factor analysis, K.M.O factor and Bartlett's test were used.In this 
study, the value of MSA (which is described by KMO) was equal to 0.725 and showed data for 
analysis at the good level. Bartlett's value is equal to 627.2264 which was at the meaningful level of 
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1% and in fact the meaningful sphericity is between different levels of data. And, these indexes 
showed that the data are suitable for factor analysis and the Kaiser criterion was used to determine 
the number of components; five components were found appropriate. In this study, the gas leak 
incidents were reviewed in fifth South Pars Refinery from 2011 to 2013. 15, 12 and 8 gas leak 
incident occurred in South Pars gas of fifth refinery in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively which 
12of them were related to human damage. It should be noted that in order to analyze the gas leak 
incidents using Tripod Beta and RCA, the main incident regarding some criteria such as human 
damage, damage to equipment and environmental dangers were selected. The weight of the different 
criteria was considered which are as follows (Table 4): 
 
Table 4. The criteria for selecting incidents with their weight 
The code of criteria The description of criteria Weight 
A The death of personnel (official [full time], part time, 
etc) 
5 
B Damage (burning, poisoning, etc.) to some personnel 4 
C Damage (burning, poisoning, etc.) to one employee 3 
D Damage to instruments caused by explosion, fire, etc. 2 
E Environmental dangers (gas or fluid leak, etc.)  1 
 
According to these cases, the choice of incidents was based on the weight of the criteria and 
it was found that the incident number (i.e. 322) had the highest points (i.e. 8) and regarding the fact 
that two of the people died in this incident, it has been a remarkable incident in recent records of the 
refinery. It was analyzed based on the considered method and the corrective actions have been 
proposed to prevent the bitter and harmful recurrence of such incidents. 
 
The Analysis of Incident Based on a Combined Tripod Beta and RCA Methods 
The Data Gathering Phase.The incident took place on May 1, 2012 at 2:45 a.m. It happened 
at the Cold Box second floor, on the 105STR-0006 flange downstream of the filter, 16-inche line 
between the demethanaizer tower and Cold Box of the fourth row of gas treatment in the phases 9 
and 10 of the fifth refinery in South Pars Gas Complex. The conditions prior to accident were as 
follows:  
At the beginning of the night shift dated 30.04.2012 in order to continue overhaul, a group of 
fitter was asked to install the hose who was discharged after working the surrounding units at 23:45. 
According to the research team, after being discharged, two victims who were the members of the 
group and were hired temporarily for the overhaul period separated from the group and went to the 
place without checking out with their supervisor.  
Based on the available evidences on the safety department, both victims took part in the 
introductory instructions of safety regulation and H2S classes in the gas refinery. However, despite 
the fact that they knew the regulations, they secretly brought the forbidden items (lighters, cigarettes 
and drugs) into the refinery and tried to use these items at the incident place.  
According to the 901825 license to work on 1054-STR-0003 filter on the southern side of the 
incident place, the place was checked by safety personnel for the presence of the gas at 1:00 A.M 
and the amount of gas was zero. It should be noted that by the time of the incident, no activity was 
started on this case.Only two activities were started in the fourth gas row before the incident and 
they are described in details in the following:  
 901832 permit license for Hydrostatic test on the 105-E-405 adapter  
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 968575 permit license for De-spading operations of 1044CC0014 coupon corrosion  
It should be noted that no hot naked flame work was done in the fourth row of the gas in the 
refinery at that night. 
According to research group studies, the evidence indicates that the creation of ignition 
source in the vicinity of the downstream STR0006 flange (only fixed with plastic cover, and tied 
with wire) and heat (which causes gradual emission of gas of hydrocarbons trapped in a blind spot 
system (based on the existing design) and the likelihood of the destruction or opening of the plastic 
cover are the main causes of the incident. 
In addition, during the two days before the incident the pressure of the demethanaizer tower 
has been fixed on zero which indicates that the flammable gases are not transmittable into other 
adjacent systems. The inactivation of three infrared gas detectors in the vicinity of the place of 
incident confirms this issue. 
In a visit conducted by the research team from the incident site, some evidences showed the 
presence of two victims in the region including 2 caps, 2 pairs of shoes, 2 work clothes, cans of 
food, tea flasks, lighters, cigarette packets, some cigarette filters and tablets of methadone, tramadol 
and sildenafil (Viagra) as well as crystal which handed over to the security office.The overall 
overview of the incident was reported as follows:  
The fire incident was reported by one of the operating personnel to the control room and the 
announcement to emergency control team via central control room recorded at 02:43 a.m. at the fire 
control center.Due to the presence of the firefighters in the south of the area, the firefighting 
operation started immediately; after the establishment of emergency control teams (firefighting, 
safety, emergency, security and the head of shift operations), they asked for the crisis team in the 
refinery because of the extent of incident. Immediately after the arrival, the emergency control teams 
found one of the victims in the east of the fourth gas row and he was sent quickly to the clinic; the 
second victim was found in the west of the fourth gas row and he was sent to the clinic. After initial 
medical treatment, they were sent to the special zone clinic and then to Ganaveh harbor. According 
to the initial medical report, the victims suffered from the second and third degree burn and were 
hospitalized in ICU and their consciousness was monitored. Both victims were part-time workers of 
Petropi Contractors Company who was hired for the overhaul period. The fire station report also 
showed that the place was on the downstream filter STR0006 flange which was opened to clean the 
filter based on the license number 901852 on April 26th, 2012 and the filter was transferred to the 
workshop, the entry toward the filter was blinded and the exit toward Cold Box was tied with plastic 
cover and wire.  
According to the available evidences, regarding installation authority emphasis on the 
installation of blind and the emphasis of the safety personnel on blinding the place to maintenance 
supervisor (with this explanation that the place should be ruptured) the mentioned place was not 
blinded,and only the entry to Strainer was blinded and the exit from Strainer to Cold Box was not 
blinded.Based on the movies from CCTV system, the severity of fire was direct and according to the 
officials at the scene, it has been low and upward. Due to lack of blockage of the downstream 
STR0006 flange and the heat, the gas (which according to the instruction was prepared in the 
system) was emitted from the system and caused the fire. The fire was completely extinguished after 
2:35 minutes at 5:20 a.m. and after immunization and gas and heat test, the STR-0006 exit was 
blinded at 6:20 a.m. 
In the incident, two people working at Petropi Contractors Company were severely burned 
and were immediately sent to hospital. The damages to the equipment consist of a number of precise 
instruments and a number of cables and destruction of the cold box body color and the destruction of 
a number of the lighting system. Furthermore, the truck (vehicle) in the first refinery (the first phase 
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of South Pars) leaked in the gearbox (fire equipment). The consequences of this incident were 
estimated based on human and financial losses. The human losses include the death of two people. 
The definite financial loss was estimated over 5.2 billion Rials while the possible loss was not 
estimated.  
 
The Appraisal and the Analysis of Incident  
After gathering information, the results from the review of the process of the incident are as 
follows: 
- Phase 9 is in the state of producing 23.5 million cubic meters per day 
- Gas treatment unit No. 4 is in a state of full pressure discharge and is also under overhaul 
- The temperature is 33 ° C 
- Wind direction: West to East 
Furthermore, from Monday(30.04.2012) the stop timeline and the establishment of the 
refineries are as follows: 
Figure 2.The stop timeline and the establishment of the refineries 
 
Due to these facts, events and causal factor (E&CF) can be drawn by RCA method (Figure 3). 
As shown, the direct causes of the incident are: 
A. Ignition sources  
B. Flammable materials  
Furthermore, the main causes of A include are: 
a. Lack of Handover of activities due to the end of the shift 
b. The concurrency of launch phase 9 
c. The preparation of phase 10 
d. Not following the HSE instructions from involved individuals  
e. The lack of proper supervision on the workers 
f. The lack of spade of the lines due to the pressure on propane cycle to accelerate the cycling 
launch 
g. Thinking about doing something else from the repair team  
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The main causes of the B are: 
a. The lack of control on the personnel by the relevant authorities 
b. Lack of control on the personnel at the time of entrance by the security guards 
c. Use of part time uncommitted and unfamiliar personnel who are not familiar with the 
dangers to overhaul the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. E & CF incident table based on RCA method  
 
Figure 4 shows the three items of incident, danger, and goal in the Tripod Beta method. 
Based on this table, three recognitions can be perceived which include: 
A. Incident recognition: fire on STR0006 flat flange on 16-inch line of the 
demethanaizer tower and cold box of the fourth row of gas (gas train 4) 
B. Goal recognition: 1. Personnel: Two dead individuals 2. Equipment (the damage to a 
number of precise instruments, body color of the cold box, parts of cables, lighting system and 
gearbox of fire truck) 3. The environment (the emission of the toxic gas) 
C. Danger recognition: The failure in the immune system: the ignition sources in the 
place of incident; (2) The failure of control system: The flammable material in the place the 
incident. These two items are the superficial failures (or direct causes). Furthermore, the pre-
conditions and invisible items in the figure are intermediate and main causes of RCA method, 
respectively. 
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Figure 4. The table of event, danger and goal based on Tripod Beta method 
 
A tree diagram of Tripod Beta and RCA methods is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A tree diagram of Tripod Beta and RCA methods 
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In this diagram, events and causal factors of RCA and the event, danger and goal items have 
been combined together by Tripod Beta methods 
 
The Suggested Corrective Actions Phase 
Based on RCA method, the “sparks” and “gas” was determined that any corrective actions are 
presented in the following figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.Corrective actions in gas issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.Corrective actions in spark issues 
 
The corrective actions can be categorized into four groups: 
 The current methods and processes 
 Use the standard equipment 
 The rules and regulation 
 Manpower Training 
 
The Recommended Solutions 
It is recommended to give the responsibility of any corrective actions to the relevant 
sections, on this basis, the recommended tasks that each section should take are listed in the 
followings: 
 The control and continuous monitoring of detectors in each unit regarding the importance 
and sensitivity of the accident caused by gas leakage or the increase of temperature of naked 
tower through repair unit or the analysis of systems 
 Prevention of presence of addicted people (or people with the habit of using drugs) in the 
refinery by the working group on security, administrative services and safety, as well as 
preventing from the entrance of the spark-generating devices into the industrial site 
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 The employment of the manpower in the works related to repairing and the establishment of 
the above instructions by the repair team or the manager of refinery; the supervisor of the 
part-time workers in the overhaul and the preparation of the instructions 
 The proper revision and implementation of the gas license instructions by working group on 
security, maintenance, operation, engineering and the supervisor of the full time worker 
 The establishment of handover instructions in shifts by the working group on safety, 
maintenance, operation and security, and the implementation of downgraded situation 
instructions 
 The empowerment of human resources by 1) determination of the indexes, 2) how to 
measure, and 3) determination of the distance and 4) bridging the gaps. 
 The necessity of wastewater treatment as well as reducing sulfur and greenhouse gas 
emissions before entering into the environment should be followed by operation and safety 
units. 
Some experiences can be gained from this incident including: 
1. Manpower training  
2. The revision of the overseas rules and regulation 
3. The management of addiction 
 
In addition, it is necessary to provide some instructions related to the prevention of 
flammable materials, manpower training and empowerment in the relevant profession and its 
obligations should be regarded (Haqjoe, 2013). 
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